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Abstract 
The interplay between a deeper, broader, well-functioning Single Market and an active and 
efficient enforcement of EU competition law is at the core of higher productivity and sustainable 
growth across Europe. This paper focuses on the domains in which competition policy can help to 
create and consolidate a genuine Single Market and capitalize on the full potential for Europe’s 
competitiveness in a globalised world. In competition matters, the European Commission has more 
power than in any other policy areas, with its combined roles as initiator of European legislation and 
as competition enforcer. The modernisation of the competition policy and law enforcement has been 
the result of the EU political, economic and social agenda. The European Commission is leading this 
process, which is the main lever the Union has to respond to the multiple challenges ahead – the 
globalisation of business and the evolution of the financial and economic crisis.  
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1. Introduction 
The crucial role of the implementation of EU competition policy and law in correcting the 
market failures that hamper the accumulation of human and knowledge capital, resource optimum 
allocation, economic efficiency promotion, encouragement of innovation, economic development and 
setting  up  employment  in  the  EU  member  states  was  a  permanent  concern  of  the  economic  and 
political  governance  system  for  almost  six  decades.  The  maintenance  of  a  normal  competition 
environment  allowing  the  companies  to  compete  „on  their  own  merits”  is  determined  by  the 
prevention and correction of market distortions generated by the non-observance by the companies or 
the governments of the „game rules” (as) instituted by the EU Treaties. Such prerequisites determine 
the  specificity  of  the  competition  rules  which  are  considered  the  „hard  core”  of  the  EU  internal 
market. 
The fundamental principles of the EU policy in the competition field were not modified from 
the beginning of this common policy, but the environment it operated in suffered radical changes due 
to  increasing  complex  and  dynamic  changes  of the global  economy.  Competition  policy  and  law 
enforcement is a common goal of the European Commission and the national competition authorities, 
and should evolve all the time, especially in times of crisis. Despite the regulatory efforts carried out 
since the 1980s, competition enforcement is crucial to remove the obstacles that still encumber many 118 
 
key sectors, where regulatory national barriers hinder growth possibilities and EU’s competitiveness. 
The effective enforcement of antitrust rules, the control of mergers and state aid contribute in practice 
to the establishment of the internal market and to the preservation of open and fair pan-European 
markets.  
2. The role of the effective competition policy and law enforcement for a 
better and fairly functioning Single Market  
The EU is the largest internal market in the world, home to 23 million companies and over 500 
million people. The Single Market, that is just over 20 years old, relies chiefly on competition and 
regulatory authorities to maintain a level playing field for the free movement of goods and services. 
The Treaties give to the European Commission the exclusive responsibility to enforce EU competition 
law across the territory of the Union. The competition-enforcement system also includes the network 
of competition authorities in all EU countries, the European Courts in Luxembourg that review the 
Commission’ decisions, and the national courts of law. 
The  objective at the  heart  of  EU  competition  policy  is  to  enhance  consumer  welfare  and 
efficiently functioning markets within the Union. The protection of the consumers’ interests is the 
standard used for the implementation of the competition policy and law which results in the quality 
improvement, the wider choice and, frequently, the price decrease, so that the European citizens may 
obtain as many benefits as possible from the EU internal market.  
Exploiting the full potential of the Single Market requires the protection of competition from 
market distortions whether originating from Member States (distortive State aids) or market players 
including public undertakings with special or exclusive rights, or mergers that would significantly 
impede effective competition. European Commission focuses on sectors with the greatest relevance 
for the competitiveness of EU economy and the greatest – direct or indirect – effect on consumers. 
Enhancing market efficiency also requires actions to terminate anti-competitive practices and abuses 
of  dominant  positions  in  key  sectors  such  as  financial  services,  ICT,  energy,  transport  and 
pharmaceuticals, where increased competition will have beneficial spill-over effects on many other 
downstream sectors. Competition policy and law enforcement thus have an important contribution to 
the Commission's flagship initiatives in the Europe 2020 strategy.  
The  implementation  of  the  competition  policy  is  correlated  with  other  public  policies  for 
growth, including industrial policy, the digital agenda, and improving the business environment for 
Europe’s companies.  
3.  The  challenges  for  competition  law  enforcement  in  the  context  of 
globalization and of the financial and economic crisis 
The new realities of the globalization process, the substantial increase of the cross-border 
economic activities lead to rapid changes of the economic environment. As a result of the progressive 
integration of world economies, in almost every industry, more and more companies have operations 
in several continents and make use of supply chains that span the whole world. In this context, the 
European Commission (DG Competition) faces increasing complex cases to investigate using the tools 
of economic and legal analysis.  
The Commission is responding to the challenges of globalisation by keeping markets open in 
order  to  improve  the  competitiveness  of  the  European  economy.  EU  competition  policy  protects 119 
 
European consumers against the potentially harmful aspects of globalisation by targeting international 
cartels, mergers and abusive practices of firms of any nationality that harm European consumers. 
Commission‘s practice shows a growing number of international cartels, and many cartelists have an 
ever more complex set-up, often using artful networks of bilateral arrangements and communication 
lines. An important strategy adopted by the Commission to fight today’s global cartels is international 
cooperation.  
   Opening up distorted markets through the enforcement of the competition rules and better 
regulation is vital in times of economic downturn. The area in antitrust that has been most affected by 
the current long crisis is that of cartels. Some cases investigated by the Commission in the past few 
years that can be defined as defensive cartels, in which companies break the law to shield themselves 
from the difficulties they face in a crisis environment. 
  In the context of the financial and economic crisis, state aid control policy was identified as a 
powerful EU-wide instrument to protect the internal market from potential disintegration. When the 
financial crisis precipitated in the autumn of 2008, the European Commission was asked to control the 
massive amounts of public support granted to Europe’s banks and adapt the State aid rules in order to 
deliver on three basic goals: maintaining financial stability, safeguarding the internal market, and 
protecting the taxpayer. In this context, the Commission embraced a new approach, very flexible, that 
materialized in the relaxation of the EU state aid rules. State aid to financial institutions has been 
crucial for restoring confidence in the financial sector and avoiding a systemic crisis. Over the last 
five years, the State aid enforcement system has proved to be a cornerstone of the management of 
the financial crisis in Europe. From a substantive point of view, the crisis has certainly reaffirmed 
the legitimacy of State aid control as a tool “essential to ensure a well functioning Single Market”. 
As part of the EU State Aid Modernization Initiative, the Commission has announced its intention 
to put in place a permanent set of rules for rescuing and restructuring financial institutions in the 
post-crisis  environment,  consistent  with  regulatory  proposals  for  a  permanent  EU  crisis 
management and resolution system
1. 
A deeper and broader Single Market – competition vs. protectionism 
The competition is at the core of higher productivity and innovation, creates jobs and drives 
Europe’s economic growth, thus being crucial for the recovery of European economy after these years 
of recession. Commission‘s experience shows that despite the regulatory efforts carried out since the 
1980s,  competition  law  enforcement  is  absolutely  necessary  in  order  to  realise  the  full  growth 
potential of the internal market. The effective enforcement of antitrust rules by the Commission and 
the control of mergers and State aid are already contributing in practice to the establishment of the 
internal market in key sectors that could bring growth to Europe, but where national barriers still 
persist, such as telecoms, energy, banking and financial sectors.  
Even  before  the  crisis,  the  European  Commission  faced  the  pressure  put  by  the  negative 
opinions about the role of competition policy in the EU. Some critics would say that Europe needed to 
go soft on competition control to help our companies respond to the challenges posed by international 
competitors  old  and  new.  These  views  are  mainly  motivated  by  the  perceived  threat  to  our 
competitiveness posed by the emerging economies and by a resistance to complete the Single Market, 
especially in certain areas such as energy, the service sector – including financial services – the digital 
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industries and telecoms markets. Also, Commission’s practice shows the general increase in defensive 
cartels, where companies take the wrong-headed decision to react to tight business conditions by 
breaking EU competition law. 
During the years of crisis the calls for a laxer competition control have become louder, and 
now some critics of competition policy are worried about deindustrialisation and the inefficiencies of 
financial markets. Commission rejects the laxer competition control and protectionism, considering 
that it would be a tragic mistake to raise barriers around the Single Market or protect national interests 
at the expense of the common European interests. In the opinion of the Commissioner for competition 
Joaquín Almunia, “What we need is a pro-active approach, not a defensive one, to reinforce the 
foundations of a credible and sound EU strategy for growth. A strategy whose goals must include a 
fully-fledged Single Market and a real Economic and Monetary Union equipped with the instruments 
that were missing in its original design. A strategy capable of reinforcing competition policy; not as an 
obsession of dangerous Brussels fundamentalists – as we are sometimes depicted – but as a vital 
component in the policy mix that can put Europe back on track”.
2 
Dr. Vince Cable - UK Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills – opened his 
keynote address to the third European Competition Forum (Brussels, 11 February 2014) with noting 
that periods of crisis increase pressure on governments to break or circumvent competition law. For 
this very reason, robust competition control at EU level is needed more than ever. Over the past few 
years, we have witnessed a profound crisis of capitalism, and supporting competition policy is one of 
the many things that could be done to restore trust in capitalism, because it shows that markets can be 
made to work. Stronger competition rules can rebuild trust in the system. 
4.  European  Commission’  practice  in  applying  the  instruments  of 
competition policy 
4.1. Antitrust policy 
The Commission fights against anticompetitive agreements between two or more independent 
market  operators  which  restrict  competition  (Article  101  of the Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the 
European Union - TFEU), and prohibits abusive practices so that new entrants can challenge dominant 
incumbents  (Article  102  of  the  Treaty).  The  main  rules  on  procedures  are  set  out  in  Council 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003 (Antitrust regulation). 
Firms are prevented from fixing prices or carving up markets among them by the EU’s strong 
antitrust enforcement. Commission takes a corrective and deterrent action with its decisions. This area 
of  work  is  “corrective”  because  the  Commission  can  intervene  only  after  companies  adopt  anti-
competitive  and  illegal  practices.  The  deterrent  effect  is  ensured  by  the  fines  and  commitments 
imposed by the Commission and also by the guidance that encourages other companies to take all the 
measures needed to stay within the law.  
The detection, prosecution and deterrence of cartels 
The  most  flagrant  example  of  illegal  conduct  infringing  Article  101  of  the  Treaty  is  the 
creation of a cartel between competitors (which may involve price-fixing and/or market sharing). The 
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setting up of cartels is the most damaging type of infringement because it causes the most harmful 
restrictions of competition, not only to the economy as a whole but also to particular businesses and 
citizens:  they  force  consumers  and  client  companies  to  pay  above-market  prices,  they  limit 
competition among rivals and negatively affect incentives to invest and innovate, and they often raise 
barriers to shield the cartel members from the entry of more innovative and efficient rivals. Illegal 
agreements thus hinder the necessary restructuring in certain sectors, increase production costs and 
ultimately thwart growth. Fighting cartels has been a core task for the European Commission for the 
past 15 years at least, and its work has kept pace with the evolution of these illegal business practices, 
in the globalization context. Even during a crisis such as this one, deterrence is the key. But the 
Commission takes into consideration the fact that some companies are in financial difficulties and may 
be driven into bankruptcy as a consequence of the fines – with the corresponding social costs. The 
goal is to strike the right balance between maintaining a deterrent level of fines and avoiding unwanted 
side-effects, such us pushing companies out of business. 
Driven  particularly  by  the  concern  about  the  damage  caused  by  large  scale  cross-border 
cartels, many competition authorities have made tougher anti-cartel law and its enforcement a top 
priority over the last two decades. As part of this “get tough” approach, it is possible to discern a 
contemporary movement in support of criminal sanctions for serious or so-called “hard core” cartel 
conduct. More than thirty countries have criminalised cartel conduct in some form. All but five have 
done so since 1995 and over 20 since 2000, and the list is growing.
3 The campaign for criminal 
sanctions has been led by the United States authorities, based primarily on the  view that individual 
accountability through incarceration is the most effective means of deterring and punishing cartel 
conduct. 
The prohibition of abuses of dominant position 
The enforcement of competition law against other illegal practices - the abuses of dominant 
position - has a particular significance for ensuring the benefits of the liberalization process in the 
sectors recently opened to competition or which are under liberalization. In some cases a dominant 
company in a market may try to exclude rivals through unfair practices so as to extract monopolistic 
rents. The ability and incentives of firms to become larger push them to invest and innovate and these 
are key drivers of economic growth. This is why getting a dominant position through internal growth 
does not represent a threat to competition environment in itself. What EU competition law forbids is 
the abuse of a dominant position. The Commission sanctions such illegal practices of dominant firms 
that distort the competitive process and hamper the prospects for economic growth. The Commission's 
view is that the higher the market share, and the longer the period of time over which it is held, the 
more likely it is to be a preliminary indication of dominance.    If a company has a market share of less 
than 40%, it is unlikely to be dominant, but it is not totally excluded.  
The Competition Law not only prohibits the abuse of dominance by a single firm, but also the 
collective abuse of dominance by several different firms. In order for such a collective dominant 
position to exist, the independent undertakings in the group must be linked through “economic links”, 
in such a way that they adopt the same conduct on the market. This could be the case, for example, 
where  two  or  more  independent  undertakings  jointly  have,  through  agreements  or  licences,  a 
technological lead affording them the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of their 
competitors, their customers and ultimately of their consumers. Collective dominance generally exists 
in  narrow  oligopolistic  markets,  where  the  conduct  of  the  market  leader  is  copied  by  the  other 
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competitors.  For  example,  the  parties  to  a  tight  oligopoly  in  a  market  with  the  appropriate 
characteristics, in particular in terms of market concentration, transparency and product homogeneity, 
are in a position to anticipate one another’s behaviour and are therefore strongly encouraged to align 
their conduct in the market, in particular in such a way as to maximise their joint profits by restricting 
production with a view to increase prices 
Some prominent cases investigated by the Commission in the abuse of dominance domain 
involve global companies and have also been scrutinised by other competition authorities. Also, a 
typical case of companies abusing their dominance is that of old incumbents in liberalised markets 
trying to protect themselves from the pressure of new competitors. In recent years, Commission’s  
investigations related to more cases in the energy markets coming from Central and Eastern Europe, 
such  as  with  the  suspected  abuse  of  dominant  position  involving  the  Czech  electricity-supply 
incumbent ČEZ, the Bulgarian Energy Holding, and the company managing Romania’s electricity 
exchange - OPCOM. The Commission also look out for companies whose behaviour risks to fragment 
the  internal  market  (this  is  one  of  the  issues  investigated  in  the  Gazprom  case;  the  company  is 
suspected of preventing market integration of gas supply and of practicing unfair prices in Central and 
Eastern Europe).  
The deterrent effect of fines imposed by the Commission in antitrust cases 
Fines imposed by a competition authority after an investigation in the public interest (public 
enforcement)  are  a  means  of  sanctioning  infringers  (companies  whose  market  behaviour  fails  to 
comply  with  EU  competition  rules)  for  their  illegal  conduct,  and  discouraging  them,  and  other 
potential  infringers,  from  engaging  in  further  infringements.  When  the  Commission  finds  an 
infringement  of  EU  antitrust  rules,  it  may  take  a  decision  under  Article  7  of  the  EU’s  Antitrust 
Regulation prohibiting such behaviour and imposing sanctions. The Commission may impose a fine 
up to 10% of the undertaking’s total turnover in the preceding business year. Commission fining 
policy is based on the principles that some breaches cause more harm to the economy than others, that 
breaches affecting a high value of sales cause more harm than infringements affecting a low value of 
sales, and that long-running breaches cause more harm than short ones.  
The decisive position of the Commission as regards the power of deterrence of the fines in 
preventing the creation of new cartels is exemplified by the decisions that imposed the highest fines in 
the last ten years which generally addressed companies involved in cartels – except for the record fine 
inflicted in the case of dominant position abuse of the American company Intel Corporation (2009). 
The total amount of the fines inflicted in cartel situations spectacularly increased during the period 
2000-2009 (around €12.9 billion) as compared to the years 1990–1999 (€832.5 million)  
According to Joaquín Almunia, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for 
Competition Policy, in the current mandate (since February 2010), the Commission has adopted 25 
cartel decisions involving 167 groups and 389 entities, and these decisions have produced fines for a 
total of €8.6 billion
4. These include €1.47 billion for two cartels in the market for TV and computer 
monitor tubes that had lasted for nearly a decade and almost €1 billion in the recent automotive ball 
bearings settlement. The main cartel decision involving financial institutions is from December 2013, 
when seven international banks and a broker received fines for a total of €1.7 billion for creating 
cartels in the markets for interest rate derivatives. In similar cases, the Commission is looking into 
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possible collusions to manipulate other financial benchmarks for oil products and derivatives and in 
the foreign exchange markets. 
Table 1: Fines imposed (adjusted for Court judgments) - period 1990 – 2014 
Last change: ++02 April 2014++ 
Period  Amount in €* 
1990 - 1994    344 282 550,00 
1995 - 1999    270 963 500,00 
2000 - 2004  3 157 348 710,00 
2005 – 2009  8 182 251 662,50 
++2010 – 2014++  8 416 555 579,00 
Total   20 371 402 001,50 
*Amounts corrected for changes following judgments of the Courts (General Court 
and European Court of Justice) and only considering cartel infringements under 
Article 101 TFEU. 
Source: European Commission, Cartel statistics, 2 April 2014. 
 
Table 2: Ten highest cartel fines per case (since 1969) 
Last change: ++31 March 2014++ 
Year  Case name  Amount in €* 
2012  TV and computer monitor tubes  1 470 515 000 
++2008++  Car glass  1 189 896 000 
2013  Euro interest rate derivatives (EIRD)      1 042 749 000 
2014  Automotive bearings         953 306 000 
2007  Elevators and escalators        832 422 250 
2010  Airfreight        799 445 000 
2001  Vitamins        790 515 000 
2008  Candle waxes        676 011 400 
2007/2012  Gas insulated switchgear (incl. re-adoption)     675 445 000 
2013  Yen interest rate derivatives (YIRD)      669 719 000 
*Amounts  adjusted  for  changes  following  judgments  of  the  Courts  (General  Court  and 
European Court of Justice) and/or amendment decisions. 
Source: European Commission, Cartel statistics, 2 April 2014. 
 
Since 2010 companies have the option to settle cartel cases with the Commission, and 13 
settlement decisions have been taken to date, with fines totalling almost €4 billion. Settlements offer 
quicker finality, a 10% reduction in the amount of the fines, and shorter decisions. 
  The severe effects that the dominant position abuse have upon the competition are exemplified 
by the Commission’s decisions related to record fines inflicted upon certain firms charged with such 
illegal actions – the cases of Intel Corporation (2009) – €1.06 billion - and Microsoft Corporation 
(2004) – €497.196 million.  
 The Europe’s telecoms industry - a recently liberalized sector and a particular one in 
terms of competition law - is abundant in cases of abuse of a dominant position. Telecoms and online 
markets are one of the sectors where growth prospects are in theory very high but these markets 
remain  fragmented,  and  cross-border  barriers  in  this  market  are  of  a  regulatory  nature.  In  the 
meantime, such barriers should not be an alibi for operators to seek monopolistic rents and impede 
innovation.
5 Considering the size of former monopolists, together with the seriousness of the types of 
conduct investigated, fines are usually very high. An interesting point regarding the fines concerns the 
recidivism in this sector where incumbent operators have been found t o have committed abuse 
                                                           
5 Cani Fern￡ndez and Irene Moreno-Tapia, Dominance in the telecommunications sector: An overview of EU 
and national case law, 4 September 2013, e-Competitions Bulletin Telecom & Dominance, Art. N° 42836. 124 
 
repeatedly. Since 1998, the Commission has imposed fines in only four cases concerning abuse of 
dominant position in the telecoms industry: Deutsche Telekom (€12.6 million), FT/Wanadoo (€10.35 
million), Telefónica (€151.88 million) and Telekomunikacja Polska (€127.6 million). The three first 
decisions concern pricing practices (margin squeeze and predatory pricing), whereas the latter covers 
access issues.  
 Commissions’ practice shows that not all antitrust decisions end with the imposition of 
fines. Under Article 9 of the Antitrust Regulation, the Commission may also conclude an antitrust 
investigation by making legally binding the commitments offered by the companies concerned, when 
these can restore good competitive conditions in a market. Prohibition decisions and fines in antitrust 
look back at the past, whereas commitment decisions look ahead towards the future. The commitments 
decision  is  sometimes  a  good  option,  especially  in  fast-moving  markets).  Commission  took  such 
decisions in several cases related to the energy sector, but also in the field of financial services or even 
in basic industries. For example, since the energy sector inquiry closed by DG Competition in 2007, a 
dozen antitrust decisions have been taken involving old incumbents in energy  markets of several 
countries including Italy, Belgium, France and Germany. In these cases, seeking commitments that 
would open up the markets has been Commission’s preferred policy. Another example is an important 
on-going  investigation  of online  search service  provider  Google for  suspected  abuse  of  dominant 
position,  which  will  probably  be  concluded  with  a  commitment  decision  if  the  third  package  of 
commitments offered by the company could finally allay the four competition concerns identified in 
the company’s business practices.  
4.2. Merger control policy 
This area of activity implies a preventive work for reviewing proposed mergers. The European 
Commission promotes mergers and acquisitions that raise no competition concerns and may bring 
benefits to the economy. Combining the activities of different companies may allow the companies, 
for example, to develop new products more efficiently or to reduce production or distribution costs. 
Through their increased efficiency, the market becomes more competitive and consumers benefit from 
higher-quality goods at fairer prices.  
The Commission has the responsibility to prevent the mergers that can lead to anti-competitive 
dominant positions. The legal basis for EU Merger Control is Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, 
the  current  Merger  Regulation.  The  regulation  prohibits  mergers  and  acquisitions  which  would 
significantly impede competition in the Single Market. If the resulting entity from a merger has too 
much market power it could raise prices substantially for consumers, stifle innovation, and generally 
distort  competition.  Mergers  going  beyond  the  national  borders  of  any  one  Member  State  are 
examined  at  European  level  and  the  Commission  must  be  notified  of  any  merger  with  an  EU 
dimension  (meaning  that  the  merging  firms  reach  certain  turnover  thresholds)  prior  to  its 
implementation  (ex-ante control).  Mergers  below  the  jurisdictional  thresholds  remain  within  the 
exclusive competence of national competition authorities, in line with the principle of subsidiarity. 
Commission  clears  the  vast  majority  of  the  mergers  that  are  submitted  to  it  either 
unconditionally  or  with  “remedies”-  normally  divestitures  -  that  preserve  a  competitive  market 
structure. Only occasionally Commission is forced to block a deal when the remedies proposed by the 
companies are not good enough to allay competition concerns. In the latest prohibition of the end of 
February 2013, the Commission did not allow the low-cost airline Ryanair to go on with its plans to 
acquire the control of Aer Lingus – Ireland’s flag carrier. Another example is the proposed acquisition 
of TNT Express by UPS in the market for the express delivery of small packages; in January 2013, the 125 
 
Commission prohibited the take-over that would have restricted competition in 15 EU countries. Also, 
in  February  2012,  the  Commission  prohibited  the  proposed  merger  between  Deutsche  Börse  and 
NYSE  Euronext  -  a  deal  that  would  have  led  to  a  near-monopoly  in  exchange-traded  European 
financial derivatives worldwide.  
   After more than 20 years in force, the basic features of the EU merger control system are 
well proven. The Merger Regulation1 has been regularly reviewed in the past to improve the system 
and to take into account evolving practice. The review of the merger control system answered the 
requirements of the business environment facing the changes brought by the globalization – higher 
complexity,  size  and  geographic  area  of  the  concentration  operations  –  and  the  requirement  of 
ensuring the appropriate legal framework for the EU enlargement as well. The Commission’s activity 
in the field of merger control is, generally speaking, considered successful and in keeping with the 
directions recommended by the European Council in order to facilitate through this kind of operations 
the restructuring process and the orientation to a higher competition as imposed by the globalization 
process. 
Nearly 10 years after the most recent reform, and in line with the Commission’s goal of 
ensuring better regulation, possible further improvements of the EU merger control in certain areas are 
now under debate.   
4.3. State aid control policy 
Under the state aid control the Commission closely monitors public subsidies, including those 
granted by means of taxation, to ensure that such measures do not give certain companies an unfair 
advantage over their competitors. The general provisions on state aid are established in Article 107 of 
the  Treaty.  European  Commission  –  using  state  aid  control  instruments  –  can  promote  a  better 
allocation of resources by preventing measures that distort intra-community competition and trade 
while allowing support measures that actually target market failures and promote policy objectives of 
common  interest  (regional  development,  employment,  research  and  development,  innovation,  risk 
capital, environment protection, and effective support of SME), and has a real incentive effect. Within 
the approach of the EU authorities, a robust state aid control is the best guarantee to preserve a level 
playing field and at the same time to make the best possible use of scarce public resources. The state 
aid can foster growth, promote social development, and strengthen the internal market when it is 
designed well.  
 In 2008-2009, the Commission adopted the “Temporary Framework for state aid measures 
to support access to finance in the current financial and economic crisis” to enable Member States to 
deal with financial problems in systemic banks, as well as to provide assistance to the real economy, 
seeking  to  alleviate  the  impacts  of  the  financial  and  economic  crisis.  The  temporary  state  aid 
framework, which expired in December 2011, helped the EU member states to counter the negative 
effects on the real economy of the lack of loans without excessive distortion of the competition on the 
EU internal market. State aid control by the Commission ensured the coordinated national responses to 
threats that have emerged from the  financial crisis in Europe and prevented costly and damaging 
subsidy races between Member States.  
The  member  states  took  unprecedented  support  measures  for  the  financial  sector  which 
included not only higher guarantees (and even unlimited) to the banks’ deposits, guarantees to the 
inter-banking loans, direct capital injections and partial nationalization, but also packages of individual 
rescue measures. The effects of the crisis on the financial markets weakened during 2012 but Member 126 
 
States continued to provide critical support to financial institutions through a number of  state aid 
measures. 
Aid to the financial sector in the period 2008 - 2012 
Between 1 October 2008 and 1 October 2013 the Commission took more than 400 decisions 
authorising state aid measures to the financial sector. In the period 2008-2012, the overall volume of 
aid used for capital support (recapitalization and asset relief measures) amounted to € 591.9 billion 
(4.6 % of EU 2012 GDP).
6 Member States have granted an overall amount of € 413.2 billion (3.2 % of 
EU 2012 GDP) in recapitalization measures (the second most used instrument to support the financial 
sector after the guarantees on liabilities). The four countries that supported their banks mostly with 
capital measures during these years were the UK (€ 82 billion), Germany (€ 64 billion), Ireland (€ 63 
billion),  and  Spain  (€  60  billion). In  the  period  2008-2012,  Member  States  provided  asset  relief 
measures for a total of € 178.7 billion (1.4 % of EU 2012 GDP). 
The  guarantees  and  other  form  of  liquidity  supports  reached  its  peak  in  2009  with  an 
outstanding amount of € 906 billion (7.7 % of EU 2012 GDP). The crisis intensity has gradually 
weakened in many EU countries since then, and the outstanding amount of liquidity support has 
dropped to € 534.5 billion (4.14 % of EU 2012 GDP) in 2012. 
Since the introduction of the special state aid regime for banks in distress, the Commission has 
analysed the restructuring or liquidation of around one quarter of Europe’s banking sector in terms of 
assets. Financial markets will remain a top enforcement priority for the Commission, having in view 
that competition policy can greatly help to re-open normal capital flows to the real economy. One of 
the lessons that the Commission have learnt during this crisis is the need for more stringent regulation 
and  new  ethical  standards  in  the  financial  services  sector.  The  European  Commissioner  for 
competition, Joaquín Almunia, stressed that ”financial institutions cannot think of themselves as being 
above the law. They must be subject to the same standards as non-financial companies and they 
should respond to the same calls for social responsibility”.
7 
 According to the Europe 2020 Strategy, “state aid policy can …actively contribute to the 
Europe 2020 objectives leading to a more sustainable, productive and growth oriented economy, by 
promoting and supporting initiatives for more innovative, efficient and greener technologies, while 
facilitating  access  to  public  support  for  investment,  risk  capital  and  funding  for  research  and 
development.” 
In 2012, the Commission adopted a State aid modernisation strategy setting out the objectives 
of an ambitious reform process. The three pillars of the reform package are:  
-  better quality aid measures, fostering sustainable, smart and inclusive growth in a competitive 
internal market, and contributing to the quality of public finance;  
-  streamlining rules and providing for faster decisions;  
-  shifting the focus of the control on the aid that can really distort competition in the EU.  
The core reforms of the state aid modernisation initiative are gradually introduced through 
the review of a number of sectoral guidelines to bring them in line with the objectives of the Europe 
2020 strategy for growth and link them with the new Multilateral Financial Framework that would 
come into force in 2014.  
                                                           
6 European Commission, State Aid Scoreboard 2013, Aid in the context of the financial and economic crisis. 
7 Joaquín Almunia, Speech at Bruegel workshop, Brussels, 18 February 2014. 127 
 
In the course of 2012 - 2013, a series of instruments were adopted, such as Regional Aid 
Guidelines, Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines for financial institutions and the De Minimis Notice. 
The  State  aid  modernisation  will  be  completed  in  2014,  when  will  be  adopted,  notably  the  Risk 
Finance Guidelines, the R&DI guidelines, the Environmental and Energy Aid Guidelines, the Rescue 
and  Restructuring  Guidelines,  the  revised  General  Block  Exemption  Regulation.  The  updated 
Procedural Regulation will allow the Commission to handle the complaints that it receives – about 
300 a year – in a way that is more consistent with the established priorities.  
5. Conclusions 
The EU has to complete its ambitious project – the establishment of a genuine pan-European 
market that could bring sustainable growth to Europe. A strong enforcement of competition policy and 
law is the basic ingredient of better-functioning markets, that enhance investments and innovation, 
increase productivity levels and raise the competitiveness of the European economy.  
As the EU’s competition authority the Commission takes executive decisions over business 
practices and government measures that can harm competition in the internal market and undermine its 
integrity. The Commission also have the responsibility to improve the EU competition law and the 
governance in the field. 
The implementation of the competition policy, strongly correlated with the requirements of 
other policies – horizontal and sectorial – is an efficient tool that contributes to the achievement of 
EU’s strategic objectives.  
Competition policy and law have been periodically reviewed to adapt to the complex new 
challenges generated by the globalization, the  process of integration of the EU and the economic 
developments.  
Preserving a level-playing field for every company that does business in the European Union 
is an important task of the European Commission and the  national competition authorities in the 
Member States. In the difficult context of the financial and economic crisis, this task has been more 
important than ever, and now the robust enforcement of EU competition law is a prerequisite for a 
rapid and sustainable recovery in Europe.  
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